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ABSTRACT 
 
This article emphasizes the contribution of International Framework 
Agreements (IFAs) to collective bargaining within multinational companies 
(MNC). For this purpose, we used various data, including content analysis of 42 
IFAs and interviews with representatives of the five Global Union Federations 
(GUFs) involved in the negotiation of these IFAs, in order to assess the content 
and efficiency of these agreements. Our analysis reveals that IFAs usually 
include a commitment by the signatory MNC to conform to ILO’s core 
conventions in all its operations, and to inform its business partners of their 
obligations under the agreement. Regular meetings are held with unions’ 
representatives for the monitoring of these agreements to ensure their respect by 
the signatory multinational companies and their business partners. According to 
GUFs’ representatives, the IFAs have been effective in protecting basic trade 
union rights covered by ILO conventions 87 and 98. In the last part, we 
emphasize the IFAs’ contribution to collective bargaining within MNCs and 
discuss the prospects for future development of international collective 
bargaining, particularly in light of Levinson’s seminal work (1972) on this 
subject.  
 
 
conomic and political changes of the last two decades have 
radically modified the structures and practices of international 
trade union movement (Bourque 2008). The dismantling of 
communist regimes in Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union has 
helped to increase the membership of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), at the expense of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) which lost most of its European affiliates in the former USSR and 
countries of Eastern Europe. The creation of the International Trade Union 
E
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Confederation (ITUC) in 2006 by the ICFTU and the World Trade Union 
Confederation (WTUC) affiliates has reduced the WFTU to a marginal role at the 
international level. The International Trade Secretariats (ITS), which group 
together national industry federations have also been affected by these changes. 
The rising power of multinational companies in the global economy has given 
rise to a wave of mergers of ITS whose number dropped from more than fifteen 
in 1980 to ten in early 2000. During this period, the ITS also set up some forty 
World Union Councils so as to coordinate union action within multinational 
companies, mainly in the automotive, electronics and chemical products sectors 
and the mining industry (Rüb 2002; Windmuller 2000). In 2002, the ITS 
transformed themselves into Global Union Federations (GUFs)2 in order to 
reflect the renewal of their goals and structures in the globalization era (ICFTU, 
2004). 
In 1995, the ICFTU and the ITS created a working committee which 
proposed in 1998 a Code of Labour Practices considered as a trade union guide 
on the codes of conduct of multinational companies (ICFTU 2002). This Code 
specifies that multinational companies (MNCs) must respect the fundamental 
rights covered by the 1998 ILO Tripartite Declaration and this same obligation is 
imposed on their business partners. The fundamental rights referred to by this 
ILO Declaration are freedom of association and collective bargaining 
(Conventions No. 87 and No. 98), the prohibition of forced and compulsory 
labour (Conventions No. 29 and No. 105), non-discrimination and equal 
treatment (Conventions No. 100 and No. 111), and the abolition of child labour 
(Convention No. 138). This last category of rights was reinforced by the adoption 
in 1999 of Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (Duplessis, 
2004; Kellerson, 1998). The ICFTU/ITS Code was used by the ITS as a reference 
for negotiating International Framework Agreements (IFAs) which the ICFTU 
presented as follows:  “Framework agreements negotiated between MNEs and 
ITS are agreements on certain principles which, while they do not constitute 
collective bargaining agreements in the same sense as agreements reached at the 
national or local levels, provide a rights framework to encourage recognition and 
bargaining to take place at those levels.” (ICFTU 2002, 22). 
Following the groundbreaking agreement concluded in 1989 between the 
IUF and the French food processing group BSN-Danone, the number of IFAs 
increased rather slowly during the 1990s and more rapidly since the early 2000s. 
According to a recent list established by Sobczak (2007), there were 50 
International Framework Agreements (IFAs) in January 2007 and nearly 80% of 
them have been signed since January 1, 2002, confirming the recent nature as 
well as the importance taken by this activity within the GUFs.  The increasing 
importance accorded to the negotiation of IFAs by the GUFs has reinvigorated 
the debate initiated in the 1970s by Charles Levinson on trade union collective 
bargaining with multinational companies. In his seminal 1972 work International 
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Trade Unionism, Levinson argued that, faced with the rapid expansion of 
multinational companies worldwide, the trade union movement must develop a 
strategy of international collective bargaining within MNCs. Only in this way 
might the unions counter multinationals’ strategies to make workers in different 
countries compete with each other as a way of increasing corporate control over 
the world economy. This article aims to highlight the contribution of IFAs to the 
promotion of workers and trade unions rights and collective bargaining in 
multinational companies, to identify the main problems associated with the 
implementation of these agreements, and to discuss the prospects for the 
development of international collective bargaining in light of Levinson’s writings 
and other recent research on this subject.  
As part of a study conducted at the ILO International Institute for Labour 
Studies (IILS), we carried out in 2004 a content analysis of 28 International 
Framework Agreements in force on April 30, 2004, and collected data from 
representatives of the five GUFs signatory to the IFAs, including the General 
Secretaries of each of them, as well as two ICFTU representatives involved with 
GUF representatives in IFA development (Bourque, 2005).  For the purpose of 
this article, we completed this study with an analysis of fourteen IFAs concluded 
between April 30, 2004 and January 2006, and with telephone interviews with 
GUFs’ representatives in 2006. Our research focused on both the content of these 
42 IFAs and their effectiveness regarding respect of the principles and rights 
stated in these agreements by the signatory MNCs and their business partners. 
Fourteen (14) of these agreements were negotiated by IMF, nine (9) by ICEM 
including a joint agreement with IFBWW and another with Public Service 
International (PSI), nine (9) by IFBWW including the joint agreement with ICEM, 
five (5) by UNI and five (5) by IUF (See Table 1).  
This article is divided into three parts. Part 1 presents the scope and 
normative content of the 42 IFAs included in our study, Part 2 analyzes the 
monitoring procedures and effectiveness of these IFAs, and in Part 3, we discuss 
the contribution of IFAs to international collective bargaining in light of previous 
research on this subject.  
 
SCOPE AND NORMATIVE CONTENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS  
 
Nearly all (38 out of 42) of the multinational companies (MNCs) signatory 
of the IFAs in force in January 2006 have their headquarters in Europe. More 
specifically, thirteen  of these MNCs are based in Germany, seven  in France, five 
in Sweden, three in Italy, three in Norway, two in Spain,  two in the Netherlands, 
one in Denmark, one in Greece and one in Luxembourg (see Table 1). The four 
non-European multinational companies involved in these agreements have their 
headquarters in the United States (Chiquita), South Africa (AngloGold), New 
33   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 12 – Spring 2008 
 
 
Zealand (Fonterra) and Russia (Lukoil).3 The number of direct employees of the 
multinational companies involved in these IFAs varies approximately from 3,000 
employees at Shwan-Stabilo (Germany) to 400,000 in the case of the French 
multinational Carrefour. The total number of direct employees of the 42 
multinational companies involved in these IFAs is around 3.6 millions, excluding 
the employees of subcontractors and suppliers that may be linked indirectly by 
these agreements. The predominance of European multinational companies 
among the employers signatory to IFAs can be explained mainly by the legal 
obligation imposed on them since 1994 to create European Works Councils 
(EWCs) integrating representatives of workers and unions from the various 
European countries in which they are present, and which must be consulted on 
the economic and social aspects of company management (Martin and Ross 
2000). The active role played by EWCs in the area of corporate social 
responsibility has, in many cases, led to their involvement in the negotiation and 
monitoring of IFAs.   
  
Table 1: 
List of the 42 International Framework Agreements at January 31, 2006* 
 
Multinational 
Company (MNC) 
Country of 
Origin of 
MNC 
Total  direct 
employees 
GUF 
responsible 
for IFA 
Trade Unions 
Partners involved in 
IFA** 
Year of 
signature of 
IFA 
MERLONI-INDESIT Italy 20,000 IMF NUF (3); EWC 2001 
VOLKSWAGEN 
(VW) 
Germany 325,000 IMF NUF (1); WCC 2002 
DAIMLER-
CHRYSLER  
Germany 372,000 IMF NUF (1); EWC;  WCC 2002 
LEONI  Germany 18,000 IMF NUF (1); CEE 2002 
GEA  Germany 14,000 IMF NUF (1); RUF (1); 
EWC 
2003 
SKF  Sweden 39,000 IMF NUF (1); RUF (1); 
WCC 
2003 
RHEINMETALL  Germany 26,000 IMF NUF (1); RUF (1); 
EWC 
2003 
BOSCH  Germany 225,000 IMF NUF (1); EWC 2004 
PRYM  Germany 4,000 IMF NUF (1); EWC 2004 
RENAULT  France 130,000 IMF NUF (9); EWC 2004 
BMW  Germany 106,000 IMF NUF (1); EWC 2005 
EADS  Netherlands 110,000 IMF RUF (1); EWC 2005 
RÖCHLING Germany 8,000 IMF NUF (1); RUF (1) 2005 
ARCELOR Luxembourg 95,000 IMF RUF (1) 2005 
IKEA  Sweden 84,000 IFBWW  1998 
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FABER-CASTELL Germany 6,000 IFBWW NUF (1) 1999 
HOCHTIEF Germany 37,000 IFBWW NUF (1) 2000 
SKANSKA Sweden 79,000 IFBWW  2001 
BALLAST NEDAM  Netherlands 7,800 IFBWW NUF (1) 2002 
IMPREGILO  Italy 13,000 IFBWW NUF (3) 2004 
VEIDEKKE Norway 5,000 IFBWW NUF (2) 2005 
SCHWAN-STABILO Germany 3,000 IFBWW NUF (1); EWC 2005 
LAFARGE France 77,000 IFBWW 
/ICEM 
ITU (1) 2005 
 
STATOIL  Norway 16,000 ICEM NUF (1) 1998 
FREUDENBERG  Germany 27,500 ICEM NUF (1) 2000 
ENDESA Spain 13,600 ICEM NUF (2) 2002 
NORSKE SKOG  Norway 11,000 ICEM NUF (1) 2002 
ANGLOGOLD South Africa 65,000 ICEM NUF (1) 2002 
ENI  Italy 70,000 ICEM NUF (3) 2002 
SCA Sweden 46,000 ICEM NUF (1); EWC 2004 
LUKOIL Russia 150,000 ICEM NUF (1) 2004 
EDF France 167,000 ICEM/PSI NUF (16); WCC; ITU 
(2) 
2005 
TELEPHONICA  Spain 162,000 UNI NUF (2); UNI Telecom 2001 
CARREFOUR France 400,000 UNI NUF (1) 2001 
OTE Greece 18,500 UNI UNI Telecom 2001 
ISS  Denmark 280,000 UNI  2003 
H&M Sweden 40,000 UNI UNI Commerce 2004 
BSN-DANONE France 100,000 UIF  1988 
ACCOR France 147,000 UIF  1995 
CHIQUITA  USA 26,000 UIF RUF (1) 2001 
FONTERRA New Zealand 20,000 UIF NUF (1) 2002 
CLUB  
MÉDITERRANÉE 
France 20,000 UIF RUF (1) 2004 
*Agreements available at :  www.icftu.org/Global Unions 
**EWC : European Works Council - WCC : World Company Works Council - NUF : National Union Federation -            
RUF : Regional Union Federation (or Coalition) - ITU : International Trade Union Organisation other than GUF 
 
In most IFAs (38/42), the GUFs joined together with other trade union 
partners to negotiate and to sign these agreements. For example, some of the IMF 
agreements were negotiated in partnership with the European Metal Federation-
EMF (GEA, Rheinmetall, SKF, EADS, Röchling, Arcelor), and others with 
affiliated national union federations (Merloni, VW, DaimlerChrysler, Bosch, 
BMW, Renault). Agreements concluded by the IMF were also signed by either 
the representatives of the World Works Council (VW, Daimler Chrysler, SKF, 
Renault), or of the European Works Council (Leoni, GEA, Rheinmetall, Bosch, 
Prym, EADS). The agreements negotiated by the ICEM also bear the signature of 
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the representatives of one or more affiliated national union federations based in 
the country of origin of the multinational company concerned by the agreement, 
and the EDF agreement (Électricité de France –French public hydro company) 
negotiated jointly with ISP is also signed by sixteen national unions federations 
from Europe, Asia and Latin America. Among the nine agreements negotiated by 
IFBWW, one has been negotiated jointly with ICEM, six are also signed by 
affiliated national federations (Faber Castell, Hochtief, Ballast Nedam , 
Impregilo, Veiddeke, Shwan-Stabilo), but IFBWW is the sole signatory on the 
union side to two agreements (IKEA and Skanska). The trade union partners 
associated with the agreements concluded by the UNI are most often internal 
sector-based bodies that correspond to the former ITS merged to form UNI in 
1999, that is, the UNI-Commerce (Carrefour, H&M) and UNI-Telecom (OTE), 
and in the case of Telefonica, two affiliated national federations have also signed 
the agreement. Of the five agreements concluded by the UIF,  two bear its single 
signature (Danone, Accor) and three were also signed by either a regional trade 
union organization (COLSIBA for the Chiquita agreement, EFFAT for the Club 
Méditerranée agreement) or an affiliated national union federation (Fonterra 
agreement). The international trade union networks involved in the negotiation 
of IFAs are an important resource for the global monitoring of these agreements. 
While most International Framework Agreements (27/42) are concluded 
for an indeterminate period, those signed by the ICEM are usually for a two or 
three-year term (five year term in the case of the AngloGold agreement). 
However, the Lafarge agreement negotiated jointly with IFBWW is for an 
indeterminate period, an exception in regard of the agreements signed by ICEM 
(interview with Fred Higgs, ICEM General Secretary, Brussels, February 2004). 
Since 2001, other GUFs have negotiated agreements for a determinate period, in 
particular the UNI which concluded five-year agreements with Telefonica and 
International Sanitary Services (ISS), the IFBWW with Ballast Nedam (2 years) 
and IUF with Club Méditerranée (3 years).  Since 1989, the IUF has signed six 
separate agreements with the BSN-Danone Group on different issues: 
information for worker representatives, trade unions and collective bargaining 
rights, employment equity, occupational training, restructuring and 
delocalization of jobs within the Danone Group. According to the IUF General 
Secretary, this “permanent negotiation” with the Danone Group has helped to 
maintain a constructive social dialogue while promoting the trade union’s point 
of view on strategic aspects of company management, in particular on 
investment and industrial restructuring projects (interview with Ron Oswald, 
Geneva, January 2004).  
The document presenting the commitments and obligations of the 
signatory parties can be one-page long, as in the case of the Carrefour (UNI) and 
Accor (IUF) agreements, or as long as six to eight pages, as in most of the 
agreements concluded by the IMF, IFBWW, ICEM, IUF and UNI-Telecom. The 
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first agreements are essentially declaratory in nature and amount to a 
commitment by the multinational company to comply with the ILO fundamental 
conventions and to ensure, jointly with the signatory trade union organizations, 
that this commitment is met in all of its subsidiaries. The other agreements are 
generally more binding regarding the obligations that they impose on the 
signatory companies and the monitoring procedures of the agreement. Thus, two 
types of International Framework Agreements can be distinguished (Hammer, 
2005). Agreements of the first type are «Rights Agreements» limited to 
declaratory clauses on the fundamental social and human rights that the 
signatory company undertakes to respect and promote. Agreements of the 
second type are more similar to a traditional collective agreement because of the 
larger scope of the rights and the obligations that they impose on the employer, 
in particular with regard to subcontractors and suppliers, the duration, and the 
procedures for handling and settling disputes related to implementation of the 
agreements. 
The normative content of the International Framework Agreements is 
essentially based on the ILO fundamental conventions. Thus, all the agreements 
examined refer explicitly or implicitly to Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 on the 
Right to Organise and the Right to Collective Bargaining, and three-quarters of 
them (32/42) also refer to the other core conventions covered by the 1998 ILO 
Declaration. Most of the IFAs also deal with the working conditions covered by 
other ILO conventions, in particular respect for national minimum standards 
related to wages and hours of work (Conventions No. 1 and No. 47), 
occupational health and safety, and respect for the environment (Conventions 
No. 156 and No. 167), occupational training (Conventions No. 140 and No. 150) 
and freedom of action of workers’ representatives (Convention No. 135). A third 
of these agreements (14/42) also refer to the declarations from intergovernmental 
international organizations, in particular the OECD and ILO declarations on 
multinational companies, the ILO declarations on fundamental principles and 
rights at work and the UN declarations on Human Rights and the Global 
Compact. Lastly, several agreements (13/42) refer to the code of conduct of the 
signatory multinational company to recognize the GUFs and their trade unions 
partners as «stakeholder» in the field of corporate social responsibility.  
 
MONITORING PROCEDURES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS  
 
In almost all cases (36/42), the implementation and monitoring of the 
agreement are under the responsibility of a joint committee made up of 
representatives of the signatory parties who meet on a regular basis. These 
agreements usually provide for an annual meeting of the joint steering 
committee (in the case of the Faber Castell-IFBWW agreement, every two years), 
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but the IKEA-IFBWW and Chiquita-IUF agreements are more binding in this 
regard because they impose two annual meetings of the joint steering committee. 
These two agreements also establish an external audit procedure involving 
NGOs and expert consultants whose mission is to conduct inspections of the 
company and its subcontractors’ workplaces and submit a report to the joint 
steering committee. These two individual cases are explained by the particular 
context which led to the signature of these agreements, that is, as a result of 
public denunciation campaigns regarding child labour in IKEA subcontracting 
companies (IFBWW 2003), and the violation of freedom of association in some 
banana plantations of the Chiquita Group and its suppliers in Central America 
(Riisgaard 2005). 
International Framework Agreements usually stipulate that monitoring 
be conducted by representatives of the signatory parties, but in some cases, it is 
carried out by an existing representative structure, such as the European Works 
Councils or World Company Works Councils which are involved in the 
negotiation and the monitoring of the majority of the agreements concluded by 
the IMF. Several IFAs confirm the decisive role of management and union 
representatives at the local level in the application and settlement of 
disagreements deriving from the agreement. Almost all IFAs provide for a 
procedure of amicable settlement of disputes or complaints related to the 
implementation of the agreement, the only exception being the Skanska-IFBWW 
agreement under which disputes related to the interpretation or application of 
the framework agreement can be referred to an arbitration board. The General 
Secretaries of the five GUFs involved in the negotiation of IFAs see them more as 
“gentlemen’s agreements,” that is, voluntary agreements that put the onus of 
application on the signatory parties only. From this point of view, these 
agreements belong to «soft law», since they do not expose the signatory parties 
to mandatory sanctions (Duplessis 2004).  The most effective sanction in the case 
of violation by the signatory company of the rights or principles stated in these 
agreements remains, in the view of the GUFs’ General Secretaries, the tarnished 
corporate image resulting from denunciation campaigns organized by the 
international trade union movement. 
In a large majority of cases (32/42), the International Framework 
Agreements include a commitment by the company to inform or to encourage 
the subcontractors and suppliers to respect the principles and the ILO 
conventions mentioned in the agreement.  Some agreements (Endesa, Fonterra, 
AngloGold) stipulate that the stated principles apply to the subsidiaries and 
administrative units that are under the direct or indirect control (joint venture) of 
the signatory company, but do not explicitly mention subcontractors or 
suppliers. Several of them limit the multinational company’s obligation to inform 
or to encourage the subcontractors and suppliers to respect the principles stated 
in the agreement (IKEA, Skanska, Statoil, OTE, Telefonica, VW, Norske Skog). 
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However, other agreements which contain provisions linking the suppliers and 
subcontractors go further in this regard. The Hochtief (IFBWW), Carrefour 
(UNI), Chiquita (IUF) agreements, and all the agreements negotiated by the IMF 
include a provision which obliges the signatory multinational company to ensure 
that the principles stated in the agreement are respected by its suppliers and 
subcontractors.  These prescriptions are very important to enforce IFAs’ 
effectiveness in the case of suppliers and subcontractors operating in countries 
where labour law implementation is deficient. Nevertheless, the agreements 
containing such provisions are usually aimed only at the direct suppliers and 
subcontractors of the signatory company and, according to the GUFs, it is 
difficult to monitor the agreements in these cases because of the weak union 
presence in these establishments. It can thus be considered that IFAs have 
limited influence in workplaces that are not under the direct control of the 
signatory multinational company.   
The effectiveness of International Framework Agreements refers to the 
respect of the trade union rights and the social and human rights by the 
signatory companies and their business partners covered by these agreements, as 
well as the impact of the procedures to monitor these agreements. As a general 
rule, at least one annual meeting is devoted to the monitoring of the application 
of the agreement, in which representatives of the different signatory trade union 
organizations participate. In several cases, these meetings coincide with the 
annual meeting of the European Works Council (Carrefour, Merloni, Leoni, 
GEA, Rheinmetall agreements) or of the World Works Council (VW, Daimler-
Chrysler, SKF agreements), which gives an international scope to the process of 
monitoring the agreement. In addition, the trade union organizations can resort 
to the employer’s independent and specialized resources to conduct studies or 
inspections within the company or at the subcontractors. Thus, since 1999, the 
joint committee monitoring the IKEA agreement, which includes two IFBWW 
representatives, has conducted several inspections of establishments belonging 
to the company’s subsidiaries or subcontractors in Eastern Europe and Asia. 
Similarly, the IUF representatives within the committee monitoring the Chiquita 
agreement participated in the inspections and the drafting of public reports on 
the respect of human and social rights in the company’s plantations and at a 
number of its suppliers in Central America. 
The interviews conducted with the General Secretaries of the five GUFs 
involved in International Framework Agreements reveal that their interventions 
in regard to the application of these agreements relate mainly to respect of union 
rights by the subsidiaries or subcontractors of the signatory company.  The 
information obtained from IUF representatives on the application of the 
agreement concluded in 1995 between the IUF and the Accor management 
confirms the conclusions of Wills’ study (2002) that it was mainly used to back 
up union organization campaigns in the Group’s establishments in the United 
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States, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Canada and Australia. According to 
IFBWW representatives, the application of the Faber Castell, Skanska and 
Hochtief agreements gave rise to problems relating to respect of union rights by 
the subsidiaries or subcontractors, particularly in the United States, and the 
General Secretary intervened with these companies’ European senior 
management in order to get them involved in solving these problems in 
collaboration with local managers in their subsidiaries in non European countries 
(interviews with Anita Normark and Marion Hermann, IFBWW, Geneva, 
January 2004). The ICEM General Secretary also had to intervene with the senior 
management of the Swedish multinational company Statoil during a conflict over 
union recognition involving a subcontracting oil refinery in Texas whose contract 
was cancelled because it refused to respect the principles stated in the agreement 
(interview with Fred Higgs, ICEM, Brussels, February 2004). As regards the IMF, 
the World Works Council of Daimler Chrysler has notified two subcontractors in 
Turkey and Costa-Rica that their contracts could be cancelled if they did not 
respect the ILO conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining 
mentioned in the agreement, which led to union recognition in these 
establishments (interviews with Marcello Malentacchi, IMF General Secretary, 
Geneva, January 2004 and February 2006). The Telefonica agreement facilitated 
unionization within its subsidiary in Brazil, but the interventions of the UNI 
General Secretary with the management of this multinational company 
concerning respect of trade unions collective bargaining rights in the subsidiaries 
in Chile have been, however, less successful and led to a work conflict (interview 
with Phillip Jennings, UNI, Nyons, February 2004).  
 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS: A PREMISE TO 
INTERNATIONAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING? 
 
In this last part, we examine the extent to which International Framework 
Agreements contribute to international collective bargaining, drawing on, in 
particular, the analysis of the conditions which led to the conclusion of the 
Seafarers international collective agreement negotiated by the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF).  
According to many authors, the ITS and the World Company Works 
Councils that they put in place were not successful in asserting themselves as 
bargaining actors at the international level, as their promoters had intended, in 
particular Charles Levinson who was IMF Deputy General Secretary before 
becoming ICEM General Secretary in the 1970s (Gumbrell-McCormick 2000; 
Ramsay 1997; Windmuller 2000). Levinson (1972) predicted that trade unions’ 
international collective bargaining structures would develop in three phases: the 
first phase being characterized by the organization of solidarity networks 
between the national unions representing employees of the same multinational 
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company; the second phase involving the coordination of collective bargaining 
within multinational companies by the international and national unions or 
federations; leading to a third phase, integrated collective bargaining under the 
leadership of ITS which involves all the industries covered by the activities of the 
same multinational company.  According to Levinson, the first two phases of this 
development were already under way in the early 1970s, and the process must 
continue as a condition of survival of international trade union federations 
(Ramsay 1997). 
Research conducted in the mid-1970s (Northrup and Rowan 1979) on 
several American and European multinational companies has, however, called 
into question Levinson’s optimistic view. As a result of a survey of several 
corporate managers and representatives of national and international unions, the 
authors concluded that international collective bargaining was not highly 
developed and essentially involved a few European multinational companies. In 
their view, the main obstacles to the development of international collective 
bargaining were due to the reluctance of companies as well as the lack of 
enthusiasm of national unions which jealously guarded their autonomy and 
were riddled with conflicts of interest and ideological divisions. The differences 
in collective bargaining structures and practices in the various countries, the 
divergent views between the unions of developed countries and those of 
developing countries, the lack of interest in international solidarity among 
members of the national unions of industrialized countries were, according to the 
authors, the main reasons referred to by the North American and European 
union officials to explain why international collective bargaining was not highly 
developed. However, these analyses were tempered in another study conducted 
ten years later by a team directed by one of these researchers (Northrup, 
Campbell and Slowinski 1988) which emphasized the progress made in the 
structures of employee representation and social dialogue in European 
multinational companies.  
In a more recent study, Dolvik (2000) emphasises the role played by some 
European industry trade union federations, in particular the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF), in the development of transnational collective 
bargaining at the European level. Thus, Shulten (2000) underlines the 
proliferation of structures put in place by the EMF in the 1990s (standing 
committee on collective bargaining, specialized working groups, conferences, 
interregional networks) to coordinate negotiations on wages and hours of work 
in the European metal industry. Similarly, Pulignano (2004) highlights the EMF’s 
strategic role in concert with the European Works Councils in view of linking the 
various bargaining levels within the multinational companies, since the 
information transmitted at the level of the European Works Councils was often 
relayed in national and local bargaining on wages and employment. However, 
Sisson and Marginson (2002) consider that collective bargaining within the 
41   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 12 – Spring 2008 
 
 
European Works Councils is limited to the settlement of non-conflictual 
problems such as occupational training and employment equity. They note the 
employers’ reluctance to engage in collective bargaining at the European level 
and their preference for benchmarking to introduce the “best practices” into their 
establishments in Europe. According to these authors, this managerial practice 
helps to standardize working conditions but also leads to increased competition 
among the European establishments of the multinational companies. 
These studies also underline that the coordination of collective bargaining 
at the European level gives rise to tensions between the national and 
transnational trade union organizations related to the sharing of powers and 
responsibilities among the various bargaining levels. These tensions also exist 
between the GUFs and their union partners in the negotiation of International 
Framework Agreements, which partly explains the essentially declaratory 
content and the limited scope of these agreements. Indeed, the latter do not 
govern wages, social benefits or other financial aspects of work which remain the 
prerogative of national industry trade unions, and more rarely of national union 
confederations in countries where wage negotiations take place at the national 
level. Similarly, with the exception of the Danone, Chiquita and Club 
Méditerranée agreements which were negotiated by the IUF, they rarely deal 
with investments, job transfer and employee protection measures in the case of 
economic lay-offs.  IFAs are not traditional collective agreements, but rather 
framework agreements on the fundamental principles and rights at work that 
national or local agreements can use or improve on, thus creating a new space for  
transnational and national trade unions’ cooperation in collective bargaining.   
The general secretaries of the five GUFs whom we interviewed in 2004 
and 2006 emphasized the importance for their respective organizations to 
conduct international collective bargaining at the industry level, and they 
considered the agreement concluded in 2000 between the International Transport 
Federation (ITF) and the International Maritime Employers Conference (IMEC) 
to be a model in this regard. This international collective agreement regulates the 
working conditions of sailors employed on commercial ships registered under 
the flag of convenience system. This system was established after the Second 
World War and allows maritime employers to register their ships in countries 
where wages and social benefits are not highly regulated, thus allowing them to 
reduce their labour costs and to avoid the national law of the company’s country 
of origin (ILO 2004; Lillie 2004). The ITF’s action in this sector intensified from 
the 1960s onwards, with the considerable increase in the number of ships 
registered under a flag of convenience. Currently, the ITF-IMEC international 
collective agreement can be considered to be the only one which truly has a 
sector-based scope, since the IFAs apply only to the signatory multinational 
company and eventually to its business partners. The analysis of the economic 
and political context which led to this original agreement is highly instructive 
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regarding the conditions and requirements of international sector-based 
collective bargaining. 
The strategy pursued by the ITF to negotiate this international collective 
agreement brings to mind the action of the first workers’ organizations to impose 
union rates on employers in the 19th century European countries. It is also 
comparable to the pattern bargaining practised by the major North-American 
trade unions in some highly concentrated industries, such as the automotive 
industry, which involves extending a collective agreement negotiated with a 
major company to other employers in the industry by resorting to strikes if 
necessary. This collective bargaining strategy is described by Sisson and 
Marginson (2002) as «unilateral union coordination», with the union 
organization mobilizing its resources in order to impose the bargaining process 
and issues on employers. The ITF has based its action on the determination of 
minimum rates for each of the jobs on the merchant ships and their application 
under the control of the ITF inspectors in the main commercial harbours 
worldwide. If a ship owner refused to let the latter inspect its ships or did not 
hand over the crews’ wage accounts, the dockers, who were also members of 
unions affiliated with the ITF, would usually prevent the ship from being loaded 
or unloaded (Lillie 2004). After many years of coordinated union action, this 
strategy allowed the ITF to be recognized as a bargaining agent by the main 
maritime employers in the flags of convenience sector which was operating an 
increasingly larger share of the international shipping trade (International 
Labour Office 2004). According to Lillie (2004) who conducted an in-depth study 
of this sector, the rate of coverage of ITF agreements in the flags of convenience 
sector worldwide was between 30% and 40% in 2000.  
The ITF has had to overcome the resistance of not only maritime 
employers but also some affiliated unions in Asia which considered that the 
main goal of the ITF was to protect sailors from developed countries against 
wage competition from the less developed countries (Lillie 2004). These internal 
tensions forced the ITF to adopt a more flexible approach by distinguishing three 
categories of shipping companies subject to different minimum rates while 
controlling the overall wage gaps between these categories (Lilllie 2004). 
Moreover, the arrival of new workers on the international market of sailors in the 
1990s, in particular from the Baltic countries and the former USSR, led the Asian 
unions to unite under the ITF banner in order to protect themselves against this 
new competition. As regards the employers, the creation of the IMEC in 1993 
was aimed at taking advantage of the divisions within the ITF in order to obtain 
lower rates for the Asian zone by counting on, in particular, the support of the 
sailors’ unions in this region. The agreement concluded in 2000 between the ITF 
and the IMEC was thus the result of a compromise which laid the basis for an 
international regulation of the working conditions of sailors working under the 
flag of convenience system. It contains not only provisions on minimum wages 
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and their annual progression from 2001 to 2004, but also provisions on hours of 
work, vacation, social benefits and grievance settlement procedures in the case of 
presumed violation of the agreement (Lillie 2004).  
What can be learned from this example in terms of the development of 
international collective bargaining? Lillie (2004) analyzes the conditions which 
favoured the success of international collective bargaining in the flag of 
convenience shipping industry.  First, the flag of convenience system created an 
international labour market whose regulation was beyond the control of national 
unions. This allowed the ITF to intervene jointly with its national affiliates in 
order to deal with the system’s negative effects on the working conditions of 
sailors in the advanced industrialized countries with strong maritime traditions, 
such as the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, the Scandinavian 
countries and Japan. The sailors’ unions in these countries supported the ITF 
strategy because it helped to slow down, or even prevent ships from abandoning 
their national flags for the flags of convenience. The affiliated unions in the Asian 
zone also supported the ITF strategy when they were confronted with the influx 
of sailors from other developing countries into the flags of convenience system. 
In this sector, the actions of the ITF and its affiliated unions in developing 
international collective bargaining complement and mutually reinforce each 
other, thus neutralizing the different national characteristics and interests which 
usually hamper international union cooperation. The highly integrated maritime 
transport industry at the international level is a key factor in explaining the 
success of the ITF’s campaign for international collective bargaining for sailors 
working under the flags of convenience system (Lillie 2004). This industry’s 
structures presented the ITF with a special situation as regards the context of 
action of other GUFs and their national affiliates within multinational companies, 
since the negotiation of wages, social benefits and other working conditions are 
the prerogative of national trade unions which are not generally in favour of 
sharing their power and authority with the Global Union Federations in these 
matters.  
Given the predominant role played by national trade unions in the 
negotiation of wages and working conditions, the prospects for the development 
of IFAs concern mainly the recognition and application of ILO conventions on 
fundamental rights and minimum labour standards by the multinational 
companies and their business partners. If we consider the scenario developed by 
Levinson (1972), the negotiation of IFAs refers to the second phase of 
development of international collective bargaining since it involves the 
coordination of national trade unions actions by the GUFs in order to establish 
minimum labour standards covering all establishments under the direct or 
indirect control of signatory MNCs. However, the coordinated collective 
bargaining of wages and other substantial working conditions at the level of the 
multinational companies, which, in Levinson’s view, represents the ultimate goal 
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of international trade unionism, implies that the GUFs’ mandates and resources 
be broadened, which constitutes a major organizational challenge for the 
international trade union movement given the structural and cultural obstacles 
to international union cooperation (Cooke 2005;  Hennebert and Dufour-Poirier 
2008; Martin and Ross 2000; Ramsay 1997). Moreover, the monitoring of IFAs in 
the establishments of suppliers and subcontractors of the signatory MNCs would 
require an intensification of international campaigns to strengthen trade union 
presence in countries where these establishments and, also very often, the worst 
working conditions are found (Cooke 2005; Hammer 2005; Ramsay 1997). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ITS and the ICFTU were the main driving forces behind the 
emergence of International Framework Agreements during the 1990s. However, 
these agreements, through which multinational companies undertake to respect 
the fundamental labour rights in all their establishments worldwide, have 
limited scope given the nature of the obligations that they impose on the 
signatory companies and their business partners as well as the voluntary and 
non-binding nature of this type of agreements. Nevertheless, the IFAs are 
important for developing international collective bargaining within 
multinational companies, whose effectiveness depends on the capacity of 
international and national trade union organizations to coordinate their actions. 
In this respect, a great deal can be learned from the experience of the European 
labour movement since the structures and coordination of union action at the 
transnational level have developed mainly on that continent over the last twenty 
years. However, the European example also illustrates how difficult it is to 
overcome trade union differences and national characteristics, whether 
institutional, cultural or linguistic. Coordination of union action in the European 
Union implies a transfer of responsibilities to the level of transnational union 
structures, such as the European Industry Federations, but the bargaining 
powers conferred on these regional union organizations remain limited even 
though such an example of extensive regional union cooperation currently 
cannot be found in any other region of the world (Martin and Ross 2000). 
The GUFs’ representatives view collective bargaining within 
multinational companies as a prerequisite to the development of international 
sector-based collective bargaining. The diffusion of International Framework 
Agreements in the same industrial sector, like the case of IMF in the automotive 
industry, could create conditions that are conducive to the negotiation of 
international sector-based agreements similar to the ITF-IMEC agreement in 
international maritime transport. But as shown by the ITF’s action in this sector, 
international union solidarity is needed to impose on employers in the same 
industry the obligation to negotiate their employees’ working conditions with 
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trade unions coalitions and thus reduce the wage gaps between workers hired 
for comparable activities internationally. Similarly, collective bargaining within 
multinational companies must rely on the support of union solidarity networks 
in order to mobilize the workers of these companies in the various regions of the 
world and to coordinate their actions so as to achieve a more balanced 
distribution of the multinational companies’ profits between employees and 
shareholders, and greater pay equity within multinational companies 
worldwide.   
According to the GUFs’ representatives, International Framework 
Agreements are an important instrument for the development of trade union 
cooperation in collective bargaining within MNCs and the promotion of 
fundamental social and human rights at the international level. They can also 
open the way for international sector-based collective bargaining on minimum 
working conditions and fundamental social and human rights. However, these 
developments need to be enhanced by international trade union structures with 
more resources and responsibilities than the GUFs currently have.  Although 
IFAs represent a significant progress for the development of international 
collective bargaining, they are still a long way from the objective that Levinson 
put forward more than thirty years ago to the international trade union 
movement. Thus, the trade union movement must continue to build stronger 
transnational structures and international solidarity in order to achieve these 
goals. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1.  This article is an updated version of the paper presented at the Global Unions Conference organized 
by Cornell University School of Industrial Relations in New York City, February 9-11, 2006. 
2.  The term Global Union Federations (GUFs) became in 2002 the official name of the former 
International Trade Secretariats (ITS). 
3.  It is also important to underline the signing in April 2007 of the first IFA concluded with a Canadian  
multinational company by UNI, as a result of an international campaign to organize workers of  
QuebecorWorld that started in Canada and the United States in 2000 (Tate 2006). 
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